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SUMMARY
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new
peace process was begun, with Israel and the
Palestinians discussing a five-year period of
interim self-rule leading to a final settlement.
Israel and Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace.
Israel and Jordan discussed relations.  Israel
and Lebanon focused on Israel’s withdrawal
from its self-declared security zone in south
Lebanon and reciprocal Lebanese actions.
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
providing for Palestinian empowerment and
some territorial control.  Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan signed
a Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994.  Israel
and the Palestinians signed an Interim Self-
Rule in the West Bank/Oslo II accord on
September 28, 1995. Israel continued
implementing it despite the November 4
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.  
Israel suspended talks with Syria after
terror attacks in February/March 1996.  They
resumed in December 1999, but were post-
poned indefinitely after January 2000.  Israel
withdrew from south Lebanon on May 24,
2000. 
The Palestinians and Israelis signed
additional incremental accords in 1997, 1998,
and 1999.  From July 11 to 24, 2000, Presi-
dent Clinton held a summit with Israeli and
Palestinian leaders at Camp David, but they
did not succeed in producing a framework
accord on final status issues.  A Palestinian
uprising or intifadah began in September.
Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of
Israel on February 6, 2001.  He said that the
results of Camp David and afterwards were
null and void.  
The international war against terrorism
after September 11, 2001, prompted renewed
U.S. focus on a peace process. On June 24,
2002, President Bush declared, “peace re-
quires new and different Palestinian leader-
ship so that a Palestinian state can be born.”
On April 30, 2003, the United States, the
U.N., European Union, and Russia (the Quar-
tet) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian
statehood within three years.  It has not been
implemented.  In December 2003, Sharon
proposed to unilaterally disengage from the
Palestinians in Gaza and four small settle-
ments in the West Bank.  Implementation is
scheduled to begin in August 2005.  Palestin-
ian Authority (PA) Chairman/President Yasir
Arafat died on November 11, 2004, and, on
January 9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected
to succeed him.  On February 8, Abbas and
Sharon declared an end to violence. 
 
Congress is interested in the peace talks
because of its oversight role in the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and
keen constituent interest. It is concerned about
U.S. financial and other commitments and the
Palestinians’ fulfillment of their commitments
to Israel.  Congress has appropriated aid for
the West Bank and Gaza, with conditions
intended to ensure Palestinian compliance
with agreements with Israel. Congress has
repeatedly endorsed Jerusalem as the undi-
vided capital of Israel, and many Members
seek sanctions on the PLO and PA.
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On a visit to the West Bank settlement of Ariel on July 21, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon reiterated that it and “the other blocs” will be part of the state of Israel for the future.
On July 22, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met Sharon at his ranch and encouraged
him to coordinate the forthcoming disengagement from the Gaza Strip with the Palestinians.
She also said that the two sides must return to the Road Map after disengagement. After
meeting Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas on July 23, the Secretary cautioned Israel
against sealing Gaza after disengagement, saying that the United States is “committed to
connectivity between Gaza and the West Bank” and to the “freedom of movement for the
Palestinian people.”  She also called for the restoration of calm and asserted that “it is
important that areas vacated by Israel will not be used as a base for terrorist actions.”
Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Resistance
Committees jointly claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli couple and wounding four
others at the Gaza border on July 24.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of Israel, until the 1990s.1
With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable.  The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with
consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in
part, to regain their lands.  In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist
incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security zone”  that Lebanon sought
to reclaim.  Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout
the years of conflict.  The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
Changed International and Regional Scenes
In 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein offered to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel
withdrew from Arab territories it occupied.  The United States and others denied a linkage,
but, during and after the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the
Arab-Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. He directed Secretary of State Baker to
organize a conference.  The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union aided
Baker’s mission. The Soviets needed Western aid and agreed to U.S. initiatives.  They also
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were unable to continue to aid Iraq, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Arab states, whose unity was damaged in the war, recognized the United States as the
remaining superpower.  Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman) joined the anti-Iraq coalition.  After Camp David, Egypt
had become the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.  Syria opposed Saddam Hussein,
sought benefactors, and sent troops to defend Saudi Arabia.  The PLO and Jordan, however,
were sympathetic to Iraq and debilitated by the choice. European and other sympathy for the
Palestinians eroded temporarily as Iraqi missiles hit Israeli civilian sites. Meanwhile,
Palestinian moderates argued for negotiations to ease the plight of their people.  Thus, each
party sought U.S. support:  Egypt as a consequence of Camp David; Syria to replace lost
Soviet patronage; Jordan to reclaim lost goodwill, aid, and trade; the Palestinians for some
gain after years of loss; and Israel because of its dependence on U.S. aid and resources.
Role of the United States
On March 6, 1991, President Bush outlined a framework for peace: grounded in U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “territory for peace.”
Secretary Baker provided non-binding letters of assurance to all parties that have not been
released officially.  He reportedly accepted Israel’s view that 242 is subject to interpretation,
stated that the United States would not support creation of an independent Palestinian state,
and that the United States would give “considerable weight” to Israel’s view that the Golan
Heights are important to its security.  He reportedly assured Syria that the United States
believes 242 applies to all fronts and gave Lebanon a commitment to its territorial integrity
within its internationally recognized borders.  He told the Palestinians that the United States
wanted their legitimate political rights and opposed Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem.
President Clinton said that only the region’s leaders can make peace, and vowed to be
their partner.  With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, the United States seemed to become an
indispensable party to the Israeli-Palestinian talks.  Clinton mediated the 1998 Wye River
Memorandum, and the United States undertook to coordinate its implementation.  Clinton
personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role.  Secretary of
State Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy, saying, “the United States stands
ready to assist, not insist.”  Since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States,
the Administration has focused on the peace process as part of the war on terrorism.
Secretary Rice also has not appointed a special envoy.
Conference and Developments
Madrid.  The conference opened on October 30, 1991.  Parties were represented by 14-
member delegations.  A Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from each.
An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the PLO.  The United States, the
Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the European Community, Egypt, Israel, and
Lebanon sat at the table.  The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb




Israel-Palestinians.  (Incidents of violence are noted selectively because of space
constraints.)  In November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to
separate Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestinians negotiating tracks, the latter to address a
five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In the third
year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators
were appointed to a PLO coordination committee, ending a charade that had distanced the
PLO from the talks. Secret talks in Oslo in 1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a
Declaration of Principles, signed September 13, 1993.  (See Significant Agreements, below,
for summaries of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Barak, and Palestinian Authority (PA)
Chairman Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a
framework accord on final status issues.  They did not succeed.  The parties had agreed that
there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved.  Jerusalem was the major
obstacle.  Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians
control over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites.  Israel was willing to cede more than
90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and
offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An
international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries.
The Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter of
Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem, particularly
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.  (See CRS Report
RS20648, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Camp David Negotiations.)
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces,
visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.  Palestinians protested, and Israel responded
forcefully.  The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising began.  On October 12, a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on
Palestinian official sites.  An international summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, on October
16 set up a commission under former Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence. 
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister.
Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, December 19-23.  On December
23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip,
and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza.
Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries.  The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount and
sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it.  Israeli forces would control
borders in the Jordan Valley for three to six years, and then be replaced by an international
force.  The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.”  (For text of speech, see the Israel
Policy Forum website at [http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].)  Barak
said he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so.  Arafat sought
clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and
refugees’ right of return, among other issues.  The talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
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On February 6, 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister and vowed to retain united
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon’s
associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were “null and
void.”  The Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States
proposals.”  Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian
refugees, or a Palestinian state and, on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank. 
On April 30, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending violence,
rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides agreed to CIA
Director Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire and restore security cooperation.  On June 28,
they agreed to a seven-day period without violence followed by a six-week cooling-off
period. Secretary Powell said Sharon would determine if violence abated. On August 8, a
Hamas suicide bomber detonated in Jerusalem.  On August 10, Israeli forces seized Orient
House, the center of Palestinian national activity in East Jerusalem, and then repeatedly
entered Palestinian territory.  On August 27, Israel killed the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.  
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one
else gave them before, the possibility of a state.”  On October 2, President Bush said, for the
first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the
right of Israel to exist is respected.”  The PFLP assassinated Israel’s Minister of Tourism on
October 17.  On November 10, President Bush declared that the United States is “working
toward the day when two states — Israel and Palestine — live peacefully together within
secure and recognized borders....” Secretary Powell sent Anthony Zinni to work on a cease-
fire, but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat in Ramallah on December 3.
On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, “who is a real
terrorist....”  On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and
perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza.  Israel charged that Arafat was
“directly responsible” for the attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant ....” 
On January 3, 2002, Israel seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-commanded freighter,
carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat “cannot engage
with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued
violence and terror.” At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that
pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
  
On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly had called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.”  Sharon said that he was willing
to explore the idea but it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s
right to “secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. 
On March 27, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded at a hotel in Netanya, killing 27 and
wounding 130.  Israel declared Arafat “an enemy” and, on March 29, besieged his compound
in Ramallah.  Its forces soon controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
Secretary Powell met  moderate Arab, U.N., and EU leaders and representatives before
visiting Israel on April 10.  On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian
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officials), proposed a conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues.  On May 8,
President Bush emphasized providing “the framework for the growth of a Palestinian state,”
while Sharon was reluctant to discuss a state before “real reform.”  After a Hamas suicide
bombing near Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before
negotiations.  After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions were not
ripe for a conference because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian government. 
On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not
compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. (For speech, see
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html].)  Then the United
States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of
sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement.  He added, “as we make progress
toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to
September 28, 2000 ... and settlement activity must stop.”  The President foresaw a final
settlement within three years. On September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary
“Roadmap” to peace.  Six weeks of relative quiet ended with two suicide bombings on
September 19. On September 20-21, Israeli forces demolished buildings in Arafat’s
compound.  Violence was at a high level.
On March 7, 2003, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister.
On April 14, Sharon allowed that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the
history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel. On
April 14, Israel submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap to U.S. officials. On April 30, the
“Quartet” presented the Roadmap.  Abbas accepted it.  On May 23, the Administration stated
that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these
are real concerns and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the
Roadmap,” leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with
reservations” on May 25.  The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time. 
On June 4, the President met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to
achieve the Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means and denounced “violence against Israelis
wherever they are.” Sharon expressed understanding of “the importance of territorial
contiguity” for a viable Palestinian state and promised to “immediately begin to remove
unauthorized outposts.”  Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, with Palestinian
groups.  On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations
against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce.  Israel was not party
to the accord, but began withdrawing forces from Gaza.
On July 17, Abbas asked Sharon to release Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks,
withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat free movement, and end construction
of a security fence in the West Bank.  Israel demanded that the Palestinians dismantle
terrorist infrastructures and act against terrorists.  In a  July 25 meeting, President Bush told
Abbas, “to make progress on a lot of difficult issues (referring in part to Israeli settlements),”
he had to fight terror. 
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners, far fewer than Abbas had sought, but it freed
more on August 15.  On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded in Jerusalem, killing
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22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more than 130.  Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and
the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought Arafat’s support to act against terrorists.  Israel suspended
talks with the Palestinians, halted plans to transfer cities to their control, imposed a closure
on the West Bank and Gaza, raided West Bank towns, and resumed “targeted killings” of
terrorist leaders. On September 6, Abbas resigned because of what he charged was lack of
support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On September 7, Arafat named Palestinian
Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia, known as Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.  
On September 9, Hamas perpetrated suicide bombings near Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem.
On September 11, Israel declared that because Arafat is a “complete obstacle to peace,” it
would remove him “in the manner, at the time, and in the ways” to be decided.  Secretary
Powell said, “the United States does not support either the elimination or the exile of Mr.
Arafat.”  On October 4, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 19 and wounded many in Haifa.  Israeli
forces killed and wounded Palestinians and demolished houses in operations begun on
October 9 to close arms-smuggling tunnels in the Rafah refugee camp bordering Egypt. On
October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three U.S.
security guards and wounding a fourth.  Palestinian authorities arrested members of Popular
Resistance Committees — disaffected former members of the Palestinian security services
and other groups.  (They were freed in April 2004.)
Sounds of  discontent with government policy were heard  in Israel.  On October 30, the
Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces said that use of harsh tactics were acting contrary
to Israel’s strategic interests by fomenting hatred and terrorism. On November 14, four
former heads of Israel’s General Security Service (Shin Bet) criticized the focus on military
considerations to the detriment of a political solution. Former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon and
Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh lead the People’s Voice campaign, a petition setting
out principles for peace (see [http://www.mifkad.org.il]). On December 1, Israeli opposition
politicians and prominent Palestinians signed the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status
Agreement, (see [http://www.heskem.org.il]).
On  December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish and democratic Israel,” he
would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces and
relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip, and it would intensify construction of the security
fence. (For text of his speech, see [http://www.israelemb.org/current_events.html].)  On
February 13, 2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but
that a final settlement “must be achieved through negotiations.” U.S. officials wanted
disengagement to be consistent with the Roadmap.  After an upsurge in violence, on March
22, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and others. 
On April 5, Sharon noted that in his plan “there is no Palestinian state.  This situation
could continue for many years.”  On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged
letters. (For text of letters, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov].)  The President welcomed the
disengagement plan and restated the U.S. commitment to the Roadmap.  He noted the need
to take into account changed “realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli
population centers,” (i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome
of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.”
He said that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in
a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting a  “right of return.”  He called for
a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented
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principles of his disengagement plan as independent of but “not inconsistent with the
Roadmap.”  He said that the “temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status
issues including borders. A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements
and an area in Hebron that Israel will retain and strengthen.  Palestinians denounced  the
President’s “legitimization” of settlements and prejudgement of final status.  On April 19,
Sharon’s chief of staff Dov Weisglass gave National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a
written commitment to dismantle illegal outposts.  On April 17, Israeli missiles killed Hamas
leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi and two others.
On May 6, President Bush stated, “all final status issues must still emerge from
negotiations....”  On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan
whereby Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the
northern West Bank.    (For text, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng].)
On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government’s right to build the
security fence, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights
and ordered the route to be changed.  The government said that it would abide by the ruling.
On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding, advisory opinion that
the wall violates international law and “cannot be justified by the requirements of national
security.”  (For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org].) 
In a September 15 interview, Sharon said, “it could very well be that after the
(disengagement), there will be a long period in which nothing else will happen” and that, as
long as there is no change in Palestinian leadership and policy, “Israel will continue its war
on terrorism and will stay in the territories that will remain after the implementation of the
disengagement.”   On October 6, Sharon’s aide Weisglass claimed that disengagement was
aimed at freezing negotiations in order to “prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state
and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.” The U.S. Embassy complained that
this view did not coincide with Washington’s, prompting Sharon’s office to restate his
commitment to the Roadmap. Yet, on October 26, Sharon declared that “disengagement will
strengthen Israel’s hold over territory which is essential to our existence.”
Yasir Arafat died on November 11.  Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and
a candidate for president.  On December 1, Israel and Egypt reached an agreement, only in
principle, on the deployment of 750 Egyptian troops along the Gaza-Egypt border ahead of
Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza.
Also on December 1, President Bush declared, “Achieving peace in the Holy Land is
not just a matter of ... the shape of a border or the site of a settlement.... (T)wo states, Israel
and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security ... can be reached only by ... the path
of democracy and reform and the rule of law.”  On December 12, Hamas and the Fatah
Hawks claimed responsibility for an explosion beneath an Israeli army outpost in Gaza,
killing five soldiers.  Sharon said that peace talks depend on the end of attacks.  On
December 14, Abbas called for “the end of the militarization of the intifadah because we
want to negotiate.” 
On January 9, 2005, Abbas won election as President of the PA.  He called for
implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues. Abbas
cautioned against “interim solutions designed to delay reaching a full and comprehensive
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solution.”  Hamas, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Resistance Committees
jointly claimed responsibility for an attack at the Israel-Gaza crossing on January 14.  Sharon
suspended official contacts with the Palestinians and instructed Israeli forces to step up
operations, but gave Abbas a chance to act first.  Abbas deployed security forces to Gaza and
reached a one-month cease-fire accord with militant groups.  Israel then said that it would
halt military operations as long as calm continued, stop targeted killings, transfer West Bank
cities to Palestinian control, allow families of terrorists expelled to Gaza to return to the West
Bank, release 900 Palestinian prisoners in two groups, and stop demolishing homes of
suicide bombers and other terrorists. Palestinians destroyed a tunnel between Gaza and Egypt
and toned down incitement against Israel. The two sides increased cooperation on security.
Secretary of State Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7.  She praised the Israelis’
“historic” decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and some West Bank areas, discussed
the need to carry out obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not
to undermine Abbas.  She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security
Coordinator, while emphasizing the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.
Rice did not attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah II in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, explaining, “Not every
effort has to be an American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are
taking responsibility.” Sharon and Abbas declared the end of violence and military
operations.  
On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised  route for the security barrier
closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7 to 8% of the West Bank to
envelope major settlement blocs.
On February 21, President Bush again emphasized that Palestinian democracy is
essential for creating a Palestinian state and achieving Middle East peace. (For text of speech,
see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html].) 
On March 1, British Prime Minister Tony Blair hosted an international conference to
support Palestinian governance, economic development, and security. On March 8, former
State Prosecutor Talya Sasson gave Sharon a report accusing state authorities of supporting
the establishment of illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank.  His cabinet endorsed “the
basic principle” that the rule of law should be obeyed, but officials said that outposts would
not be uprooted until after the withdrawal from Gaza.  On March 16, Israel handed Jericho
over to PA control.  On March 17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend the “calm” or
informal truce until the end of the year if Israel stops  military operations against Palestinians
and frees all prisoners.  On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to PA control.
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the building
of  3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and  East Jerusalem,
in the E-1 corridor.  Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from
Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and
prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state.  Secretary Rice told the Los Angeles Times on
March 25 that the plan was “at odds with American policy.”  On April 4, however, Sharon
told a Knesset committee, “There is a need to carry out construction in the E-1 corridor.”  On
April 5, President Bush noted, “(T)he Roadmap ...  calls for no expansion of the settlements.”
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On April 11, Sharon and President Bush met at the President’s ranch. The President
conveyed his “concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes Roadmap
obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.” He said that there is “no expansion of
settlements” under the Roadmap.  Mr. Bush strongly supported Israel’s plan to disengage
from the Gaza.  He repeated that “new realities on the ground make it “unrealistic” to think
that a final settlement would lead to a return to 1949 borders, but this was to be agreed with
the Palestinians. Sharon restated his support for a democratic Palestinian state with territorial
contiguity and his position that Israel would proceed with the Roadmap only after the
Palestinians act against terror.  He stated,  “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli
population centers will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement” and
declared that Ma’ale Adumim is a major population center and, therefore, Israel is interested
in contiguity between it and Jerusalem.
On April 15, the Quartet appointed outgoing World Bank President James Wolfensohn
to be their Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement.  On April 24, the Palestinians said that
they were seeking free movement in and out of Gaza, control of the crossing into Egypt, and
safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank after disengagement.  Israeli officials said that
they would not turn over  more cities to Palestinian security control or release more prisoners
until the PA disarms militants and acts against terror.  Palestinian officials charged that the
Israelis were reneging on promises made in February — promises that the Israelis said were
linked to Palestinian actions to counter terror. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz met Palestinian
Interior Minister Yusuf and they later agreed to coordinate security for the disengagement.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House.  President Bush said that
“changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.”  He reaffirmed, “A viable
two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories
will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza.
This is the position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at
the time of final status negotiations.”  He said, “Israel should not undertake any activity that
contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations with regard to Gaza,
the West Bank, and Jerusalem.  Therefore, Israel must remove unauthorized outposts and
stop settlement expansion.  The barrier being erected by Israel as part of its security effort
must be a security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future
state should be those of before the 1967 war, that is, include East Jerusalem, the West Bank,
and Gaza Strip.  He asserted, “there is no justification for the wall and it is illegitimate.”  He
also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the Gaza disengagement with Israel and
called for moving immediately thereafter to final status negotiations.  He later clarified that
he seeks “back-channel” talks on final status issues.  President Bush noted that Israel’s
disengagement “presents an opportunity to lay the groundwork for a return to the Roadmap,”
which is a phased process.  The White House said that Gen. Ward will promote Israeli-
Palestinian security coordination in addition to assisting with Palestinian security reforms.
On June 2, Israel released 398 Palestinian prisoners.
On June 18-19, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA.  She found a “good spirit of
cooperation” and said that “security is the most important issue” because an orderly
disengagement would lead to greater confidence between the parties and “an ability to
accelerate progress on the Roadmap.” Rice announced the Israelis and the Palestinians had
agreed that settler homes should be removed:  Israel will demolish the homes, and the PA
or a third party will clear the debris.  Demolition will take three months. 
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At a June 21 meeting with Abbas in Jerusalem, Sharon expressed disappointment with
the PA’s inaction against escalating violence. Sharon authorized Abbas to prepare the Gaza
airport for  reopening and announced that Israel would transfer control of Bethlehem and
Qalqilyah to the PA within two weeks. (This has not happened.)  In lieu of Palestinian action,
Israeli forces stepped up operations against the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). At Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearings on June 29, Gen. Ward said that the Palestinians did
not yet have the ability to combat terrorism, while Assistant Secretary of State Welch
observed, “Palestinian performance in confronting violence has been far from satisfactory.”
On June 30, Israeli security forces forcibly removed extremist Israeli opponents of
disengagement from a hotel in the Neve Dekalim settlement in southern Gaza.  On July 10,
the Israeli cabinet approved the final route of the security barrier around Jerusalem, ensuring
that the large settlement of Ma’ale Adumim remains on the Israeli side and that there is a
Jewish majority in the city, while 55,000 Palestinian residents, or one-quarter of the Arab
population of East Jerusalem, are left outside. 
PIJ claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and
injuring more than 90.  Israeli forces then launched operations against the PIJ, reoccupying
Tulkarem and closing the West Bank. The Israeli Defense Ministry cancelled meetings with
Palestinian security officials.  Meanwhile, Hamas sharply increased rocket and mortar fire
against settlements in Gaza and towns in southern Israel.  Israel helicopters responded by
firing missiles at targets in Gaza and the West Bank.  The PA declared a state of emergency
as its security forces clashed with Hamas.  On July 17, Abbas appealed to militant groups to
abide by the informal cease fire and avoid jeopardizing Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, while
Israel threatened to invade Gaza and the Israeli army arrested 30 Hamas and PIJ members
in the West Bank.  Egypt mediated a truce between Palestinian factions on July 20. 
On July 13, Sharon closed the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank to non-resident
Israelis intending to disrupt disengagement.  On July 18, the Israel Defense Forces prevented
a protest march from the Negev to Gush Katif, with  soldiers and police encircling a southern
Israeli town where 7,000 protesters were camping.  On July 20, the Council of Judea,
Samaria, and Gaza settlements (Yesha Council) ended the march and announced that it
would instead infiltrate small groups into southern Gaza, with the goal of having 10,000
people there in two weeks. 
Israel-Syria.  Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square
miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967.  Israel applied its law and
administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize.
Syria initially referred to its goal as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty,
preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and disdained separate agreements between
Israel and Arab parties.  Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that 242 applies to all fronts.  Syria submitted a draft declaration
of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement.”  Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
accepted an undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.”  On
September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for total
withdrawal.”  Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Asad announced interest
in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different speeds.  In June,
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Secretary of State Christopher said that the United States might be willing to guarantee
security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was
ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel.  The sides inched toward each
other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable.  Asad again told President Clinton on
October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations  in return for full withdrawal.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S.
auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take
topographical features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal.
Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Golan
stations, but Syria insisted on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other
from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs.  It was proposed that Syria
demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes.  Rabin said that Israeli troops
must stay on the Golan after its return to Syria.  Syria said that this would infringe on its
sovereignty, but government-controlled media accepted international or friendly forces in the
stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
A new Israeli government called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to
Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining sovereignty would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967-
border (as opposed to the international border of 1923).  Israeli negotiators say that Rabin
had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s security and normalization needs,
which Syria did not.  An Israeli law passed on January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member
majority and a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June, Prime Minister-elect Barak and Asad exchanged compliments through a British
writer.  Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from “the point where they left off,” with
each side defining the point to its satisfaction.  Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met
in Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10,
2000.  President Clinton intervened.  On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli
success in delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and
an early-warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the  leak of the summary,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000, were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported  “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for talks
to resume.  Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw
to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and
on the early-warning station.  Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main
obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him.  Ariel Sharon became Prime
Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights.   In a December
1 New York Times interview, Bashar Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations
from where they broke off.  Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hizballah
and Palestinian terror organizations.  (See also CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues.) 
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Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought Israel’s
unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern Lebanon, and the end
of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its shelling of villages that Israel
said were sites of Hizballah activity.  Israel claimed no Lebanese territory,  but said that it
would withdraw only when the Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hizballah
attacks on northern Israel.  Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing
Israel’s security concerns.  The two sides  never agreed.  Syria, which dominated Lebanon,
said that Israel-Syria progress should come first.  Israel’s July 1993 assault on Hizballah
prompted 250,000 people to flee south Lebanon.  Secretary of State Christopher arranged a
cease-fire.  In March/April 1996, Israel again attacked Hizballah and Hizballah fired into
northern Israel.  The two sides agreed to a cease-fire monitored by U.S., French, Syrian,
Lebanese, and Israeli representatives, but retained the right of self-defense. 
On January 5, 1998, Israel’s Defense Minister indicated readiness to withdraw from
southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of peace
and security in the region, were implemented.  He and Netanyahu then proposed withdrawal
in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an
unconditional withdrawal.  As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased
later in 1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal.  In April 1999,
however, Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon, and in June, the Israeli-allied South
Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone.  New Prime
Minister Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, (i.e., Hizballah.) He argued that Palestinian refugees
residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected their implantation
in Lebanon.  He rejected Secretary of State Albright’s assertion that refugees will be a subject
of Israeli-Palestinian final status talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.
Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also
withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel
informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon informed the U.N. that Israel’s
withdrawal would not be complete unless it included Sheba’a farms.  On May 23, the
Secretary General noted that most of Sheba’a is within the area of operations of the U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement,
and recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the
SLA collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal.  Hizballah took over the
former security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had
withdrawn. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the
border region because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hizballah. (See CRS
Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications.)  
On October 7, Hizballah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers.  On
October 16, Hizballah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel.  On November 13,
the Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control of the area vacated by
Israel  On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hizballah attacked its soldiers in Sheba’a, Israel,
claiming that Syria controls Hizballah, bombed Syrian radar sites in Lebanon.  In April, the
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U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased
out.  On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hizballah shelled Israeli positions in Sheba’a and northern Israel.  Israel
responded with air strikes, and concern about a possible second front (in addition to the
intifadah). At its request, the Secretary General contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents
and, on April 8, Vice President Cheney called President Asad. In April, Secretary Powell
visited northern Israel and called on Syria to curb Hizballah.  While in Lebanon and Syria,
he urged the cessation of attacks, which stopped briefly and then resumed intermittently, as
did Israeli retaliation.  On January 30, 2004, Israel and Hizballah exchanged 400 Palestinian
and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli
colonel and the bodies of the 3 Israeli soldiers. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the withdrawal
of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon.  There were massive anti-Syrian
demonstrations in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.  On March 5, Asad announced plans for a phased withdrawal
of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was completed on April 26. 
Israel-Jordan.  Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian.  Jordan
initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and economic
matters on September 14, 1993.  A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See
Significant Agreements below).  The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew from
Jordanian land on February 9, 1995.  More agreements followed. 
On March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the
peace process....”  After Israeli agents failed to assassinate a Hamas official in Jordan on
September 25, 1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin,
which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the
detained agents. In December 1998, the King lambasted Netanyahu and called for Jordan-
Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national
interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son.  
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in
Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that Jerusalem be an Israeli
and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.  On November
21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new ambassador to Israel because of its
“aggression” against the Palestinians. On March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss
Israel’s security fence and disengagement from Gaza.  In February 2005, Jordan proposed
deploying about 1,500 Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West
Bank, pending approval of the PA and Israel, which neither has given.  Jordan is training of
Palestinian security forces’ officers in Jordan. Also in February, Jordan sent an ambassador
to Israel and, in March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years.
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Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition.  On September 9, 1993, Arafat recognized Israel’s
right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East
peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  He renounced terrorism and violence
and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict
his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National
Council, and called upon his people to reject violence.  Rabin recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it. (For text, see
[http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].)
Declaration of Principles.  On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
for the West Bank and Gaza on August 19, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since
January 1993.  Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho;
transfer of authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians;
election of a Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza with
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem voting, etc.  During the interim period, Israel is to be
responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations.  Permanent
status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may include Jerusalem. (For
text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].)
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area.  Signed on May 4, 1994,
provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the Palestinian Authority’s
(PA) responsibilities.  The accord began the five-year period of interim self-rule. (For text,
see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].)
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.  Signed on October 26, 1994. 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip.  (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.)  Signed on September 28, 1995.  Annexes deal with
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, and the release of  prisoners.  Negotiations on permanent status to
begin in May 1996.  An 82-member Palestinian Council and Head of the Council’s Executive
Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense Force redeploy from Jenin, Nablus,
Tulkarm, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages.  Israel will
redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis.  Israel will be responsible
for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements.  Palestinians will be totally
responsible for Area “A,” the six cities.  Israeli responsibility for overall security will have
precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns
and villages.  Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas. Palestinian
Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the
Council’s inauguration. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].)
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron.  Initialed by Israel and the
PA on January 15, 1997.  Details security arrangements.  Accompanying Israeli and
Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State Christopher to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. (For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].)
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Wye River Memorandum.  Signed on October 23, 1998.  Delineated steps to
complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements accompanying the
Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian
security measures.  The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% of the West
Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2%.  The PLO Executive and Central
Committees will reaffirm a January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that
specified articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been nullified in April 1996.  The
Palestine National Council will reaffirm these decisions.  President Clinton will address this
conclave.  (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm]; also see CRS Report
98-911, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Wye River Memorandum.)
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum.  (Also called Wye II.)  Signed on September 4,
1999.  Agreed to resume permanent status negotiations for an agreement by September 13,
2000. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm]; see also CRS Report
RS20341, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum.)
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April
30, 2003, by the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and
Russia).  To achieve a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for
the Palestinians to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake
political reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity.  Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with provisional
borders.  Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement and end of the conflict.  (For
text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].)
Role of Congress
Aid.  (See also CRS Issue Brief IB85066, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, CRS Report
RS21594, United States Aid to the Palestinians, and CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians
and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States.)  P.L. 108-447, December 8, 2004
prohibits aid for a Palestinian state unless its leaders have not supported terrorism, have been
democratically elected, have demonstrated their commitment to peaceful coexistence with
Israel, have taken measures to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and have
established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts.  The President may
waive the prohibition for national security interests.  The act  also prohibits aid to the PA
unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest.  On July 9, 2003, and
December 8, 2004, President Bush waived a similar restriction and each time granted $20
million to the PA  In his February 2, 2005, State of the Union address, President Bush
pledged $350 million in aid for Palestinian democracy and security programs: $200 million
was in the FY2005 supplemental and $150 million was in the FY2006 request. On February
7, Secretary Rice announced that $40 million in reprogrammed aid would be provided via
non-governmental organizations over the next 90 days for Palestinian social and economic
programs. H.R. 3057, passed in the House on June 28, 2005 and in the Senate on July 20,
prohibits aid to a Palestinian state and to the PA.  The House requires the President to report
on the PA’s steps to arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and dismantle the terrorist




P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2005,
states that $200 million should be made available for programs to support the Palestinians,
of which $50 million should be made available for assistance to Israel to help ease the
movement of Palestinian people and goods in and out of Israel; $5 million in ESF is for
evaluating PA’s accounting procedures and an audit of its expenditures. The act continues
the ban on direct aid to the PA.  On May 26, 2005, President Bush promised the PA$50
million in direct aid for projects in Gaza from unobligated FY2005 funds.  H.R. 3057
recommends $150 million in funding for the West Bank and Gaza, with audit and reporting
requirements.  On July 8, the G-8 group of industrialized countries pledged $3 billion for the
PA over three years from 2006 to 2008.  The U.S. share has not been specified.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel over
three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the Administration
deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year for spending on the
security fence and settlements.  Congress has extended the period for the guarantees through
2008.  The Israeli press has reported that Israel is requesting about $2.25 billion in grants and
loan guarantees over four years to relocate military bases from the Gaza Strip, to develop the
Negev and Galilee regions, and for other purposes,  but no aid to help compensate settlers.
Jerusalem.  Israel annexed the city in 1967 to be its eternal, undivided capital.
Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital. Successive U.S. Administrations have
maintained that the parties must determine its fate. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and
S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must
remain the undivided capital of Israel.  Congress prohibits official U.S. government business
with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices
in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows Israel to be recorded as the place of birth
of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.  (See P.L. 108-447, December 4, 2004, and H.R. 3057,
passed in the House on June 28, 2005 and in the Senate on July 20.)
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital,
that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that
Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem.  Opponents say  a
move would undermine the peace process, U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with
Palestinians, and prejudge final status.  P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the
embassy’s relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national
security interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open.  Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority.
The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-228, September 30,
2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy “immediately.” The President
replied that the provision would “if construed as mandatory ...  impermissibly interfere with
the president’s constitutional authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State
Department declared, “our view of Jerusalem is unchanged.  Jerusalem is a permanent status
issue to be negotiated between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold Syria accountable
for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace.  On May 11, 2004 and May 5, 2005,
he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria.
